In 2021, the Japanese icebreaker Shirase was seen in the southern part of Cockburn Sound, Western Australia, between Garden Island and the Kwinana Grain Terminal. Photo: Calistemon
The SHIPS for America Act of 2024, introduced in December 2024, marks a step in revitalizing the United States (U.S.) maritime industry while opening doors for deeper cooperation with Japan, a key treaty ally. This bipartisan legislation aims to expand the U.S.-flagged fleet with provisions that could strengthen Japan-U.S. Arctic shipbuilding ties. By leveraging this act, both nations can enhance their maritime capabilities and counter shared geopolitical challenges, such as China’s growing maritime dominance.
The act serves as a legislative framework that facilitates Japan-U.S. shipping cooperation in several practical ways. First, Section 510 calls for a study on reducing export controls and International Traffic in Arms Regulations restrictions for foreign-owned maritime companies investing in U.S. shipbuilding. This provision could benefit Japanese companies by lowering barriers to investment in U.S. shipyards. For example, Japanese firms with expertise in advanced shipbuilding technologies could partner with U.S. yards, boosting production capacity for Arctic-capable vessels while sharing costs and expertise. Second, Section 301 allows the U.S. to enter into agreements with treaty allies like Japan to meet wartime sealift requirements, strengthen strategic capabilities, and support maritime industries. This opens the door for formalized Japan-U.S. collaboration, potentially including joint shipbuilding projects or coordinated logistics for Arctic operations. Third, Section 618 establishes an international exchange program for mariners, naval architects, and marine engineers between the U.S. and allied countries. This could foster technical collaboration between U.S. and Japanese engineers to enhance innovation in ship design suited for extreme environments like the Arctic.
Incorporating the SHIPS for America Act into the discussion of Japan-U.S. cooperation highlights a timely opportunity on two fronts. On the one hand, Russia and China are intensifying their Arctic partnership. Economically, bilateral trade reached a record high of USD 240.11 billion in 2023, a 26.3 percent increase from the previous year. Militarily, cooperation has deepened with joint naval exercises near Alaska in 2023 and a combined bomber patrol in July 2024. A key initiative is their plan to build five Arc7 ice-class containerships as part of a joint venture, which was announced in 2024. Operated by NewNew Shipping Line, these vessels will enable year-round shipments on the Arctic Express route, connecting Shanghai and Ningbo to St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk.
China’s dominance in shipbuilding further strengthens this partnership. In 2024, China secured 74.1 percent of newbuilding orders globally. Chinese shipyards, such as Guangzhou Shipyard International, have built ice-capable vessels like the Boris Sokolov. This showcases their advanced shipbuilding capabilities. China is also known to use civilian shipyards for military purposes. This strategy strengthens its naval capabilities and provides access to foreign technology and funding that might otherwise be restricted for military use. Moreover, China often conducts civilian Arctic research on subject matter with military applications. For example, the Haiyan glider, used on China’s Xue Long icebreaker, can gather deep-sea data without being easily detected to aid submarine navigation under ice.
On the other hand, the U.S. shipbuilding industry has declined over the past few decades and now accounts for only 0.2 percent of global production. Moreover, with only two functional icebreakers designed to operate in the Arctic, the U.S. is critically outpaced by the growing shipbuilding fleets of China and Russia despite having a significant Arctic coastline. Currently, Russia possesses 41 icebreakers while China is believed to have at least five with plans to build new vessels between the two.
By partnering with Japan, the U.S. could fill a gap in its Arctic shipbuilding capabilities and boost its shipbuilding sector without relying solely on domestic production while countering Russia and China. In 2023, Japan is a top global shipbuilder, ranking third worldwide with a 15 percent market share, as measured by gross tonnage. Gross tonnage, which measures a ship’s internal volume, is a standard metric for assessing shipbuilding capacity. This metric excludes military vessels, yachts, fishing vessels, offshore platforms, and barges. Along with China and South Korea, Japan accounts for more than 90 percent of the global shipbuilding market. A possible avenue for cooperation is Japan’s inclusion in an extended version of the early-stage Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact). The ICE Pact is a partnership between the U.S., Canada, and Finland to enhance the production of icebreaker ships and bolster shipbuilding capacities in these countries.
Japan’s inclusion in an extended ICE Pact is bolstered by its strategic engagement in the Arctic. Despite its geographical distance from the region, Japan has developed a comprehensive Arctic policy since 2015. Japan’s Arctic initiatives, such as building its first Arctic research vessel and launching a diplomatic initiative with five northern European countries (Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden), reflect its growing interest and active involvement in the region. As an active stakeholder in Arctic governance, Japan participated in the negotiations for the legally binding 2021 Central Arctic Ocean Fishing Agreement. Its role in Arctic Circle conferences further underscores its potential as a strategic partner. Additionally, Japan’s experience with vessels like the Shirase icebreaker strengthens its shipbuilding capabilities. These efforts align with its growing role in Arctic governance, making it a natural fit for the ICE Pact and broader Japan-U.S. maritime cooperation under the SHIPS for America Act. This synergy not only addresses U.S. deficiencies in Arctic shipbuilding but also leverages Japan’s industrial strengths to create a win-win scenario.
Japan’s expertise could help the ICE Pact expand its capacity in shipbuilding, especially in producing the icebreakers necessary for Arctic operations. To achieve this, joint funding for the design and construction of icebreakers and ships would be necessary. Furthermore, extending the ICE Pact to include Japan would strengthen multilateralism in Arctic governance. Japan’s involvement would diversify the ICE Pact’s membership beyond NATO allies, emphasizing its broader role in Arctic affairs. It would also demonstrate international support for shipbuilding cooperation in the Arctic. Together, these efforts could create a stronger coalition to ensure open access and adherence to international laws.
However, challenges remain. First, Japan’s non-Arctic status could create friction with Arctic states. Some countries view the Arctic as a region primarily for Arctic-rim nations and may resist including Japan in initiatives focused on the Arctic. However, Japan’s active participation in the 2021 Central Arctic Ocean Fishing Agreement and its diplomatic engagement with northern European countries highlight its legitimacy as a stakeholder. These actions could help mitigate resistance to Japan’s involvement in Arctic initiatives. Second, closer Japan-U.S. cooperation in Arctic shipbuilding carries potential geopolitical risks. It could be perceived as provocative by China and Russia, possibly escalating tensions in the region.
The SHIPS for America Act of 2024 represents an opportunity to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry and deepen strategic cooperation with Japan, a key ally with significant shipbuilding expertise. By leveraging Japan’s shipbuilding capabilities, the U.S. can address its deficiencies in icebreaker production and enhance its presence in the rapidly evolving Arctic region. This partnership is especially timely given the deepening Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic, as evidenced by their joint naval exercises and plans for ice-class containerships. However, realizing the full potential of this cooperation will require navigating diplomatic challenges, particularly in reassuring Arctic states of Japan’s constructive role as a non-Arctic nation. Ultimately, the SHIPS for America Act offers a framework for strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance to ensure a more coordinated and effective response to the shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Arctic.
Khang Pham is a Master’s candidate in International Relations at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan. Pham’s research is centered around Climate Security with a regional focus on Asia-Pacific and the Arctic.
